In spring 2005, villagers in Dongyang County, Zhejiang were unhappy. For four years, they had been complaining about pollution emitted by 13 factories located in the Zhuxi Chemical Park. But nothing had been done. So they set up a tent encampment to block delivery of supplies to the factories. At first, they employed restrained tactics, including going about daily life in the tents, badgering cadres sent to demobilize them, and kowtowing. After a harsh repression produced hundreds of injuries and left dozens of damaged vehicles and other evidence of police action strewn about, the tent-sitters switched to more aggressive tactics, including denouncing local leaders, carrying out mock funerals, interrogating factory owners, and ransacking homes of 'traitors'. The authorities' ill-considered and poorly-timed repression led to tactical escalation, helped draw thousands of people to the scene, and ultimately resulted in the chemical park being closed. This episode speaks to the 'dissent-repression nexus' and suggests that repression can be counterproductive when it encourages protesters to ratchet up their tactics and a 'protest spectacle' ensues. In today's China, striking displays and theatrical performances, especially in the wake of a crackdown, can attract an audience, bring in financial support and create a carnival-like atmosphere in which popular acclaim, the breakdown of social order and the inversion of power hierarchies grants protesters leverage and induces the authorities to make concessions.
timing. 4 No matter what they find, researchers tend to agree that using force to break up a demonstration, march, or sit-in is often a turning point that can shape the course contention takes.
5
As a transformative event, repression not only affects how much protest occurs; it can also influence tactical choices. 6 Under the threat of police disruption, challengers sometimes adapt their approach and conduct underground mobilization in lieu of public action. 7 They may also opt for more confrontational tactics, especially if forceful suppression is seen to be illegitimate and people come to believe that resorting to violence is justified, 8 or if they 'come to see peaceful protest as futile'. 9 But just how and when tactics are radicalized is not well understood. Compared to a number of studies that explore the effects of coercion on protest frequency, we know little about how repression can 'shift challengers from one tactic to another'.
10
The existing literature also pays less attention than it might to how repression can sensitize the public by creating a 'protest spectacle' 11 packed with striking displays and dramatic performances. Repression enhances a spectacle in various ways. Among others, it may lead to more intense and theatrical confrontations. Police action also may leave evidence of coercion on the scene, such as tear gas shells and burned vehicles.
Compelling performances with effective props on a site where an injustice occurred can and induces the authorities to make concessions.
Drawing on an episode of an environmental activism in Zhejiang, we examine repression, tactical escalation and the power of spectacle. We show how restrained popular action, in this case erecting tents, first led to a measured response from the authorities that focused on persuasion. But within several weeks this changed. After people from other villages joined the tent-sitters, the encampment was broken up with overwhelming police force. The deployment of over 1,500 police officers and local cadres to suppress several dozen elderly protesters was considered excessive by the activists and the broader community, and produced additional mobilization and a noticeable radicalization of tactics. The tent-sitters ratcheted up the theatricality of their actions and demonstrated considerable skill manipulating symbols. Evocative, subtle performances moved the audience and repeatedly wrong-footed the authorities. In particular, the display of evidence that undue force had been employed contributed to the spectacle and drew in onlookers and new participants from neighboring villages and even other counties. A carnival-like atmosphere ensued and the number of tents grew. People milled about the encampment for weeks and sellers of sesame cakes and iced desserts came to serve the crowd. With the hierarchies of everyday life on the verge of being inverted, 13 county leaders felt great pressure to end the 'chaos' (luan), and concessions soon followed.
To trace how repression affected the tent-sitters' tactics and helped create a 'protest spectacle', the second author conducted three and one-half months of fieldwork in badgering and the din: 'There were always a handful of people buzzing around asking us to solve the pollution problem, no matter why we went to the encampment'.
19
Beyond pestering the work team, tent-sitters and the spectators they attracted were sometimes more aggressive. On several occasions, local leaders were pushed to the front of the crowd to speak and when the audience concluded that their remarks resembled 'a dragonfly flitting along the surface of the water' (qingting dianshui), protesters and onlookers insisted that they not leave until they vowed to halt the pollution and gave a date for doing so. 20 One county official whose speech the crowd found especially wanting ended up fleeing the tent area and running into nearby fields with a gaggle of older women chasing after him shouting 'wait, wait, the problem hasn't been solved'.
21
As the authorities intensified their thought work, the tent-sitters' tactics became less restrained. When work team members entered the encampment, elderly protesters often immediately donned white mourning robes and hats, lit incense, knelt down, and began kowtowing. 22 While kowtowing, they would chant: 'we beg you to save us' (qiuqiu nimen, jiujiu women). After they finished, they often scooped up a handful of dirt, placed it on the hood of an official's car, and stuck incense in it. Sometimes they also pasted slips of white paper on government vehicles. These actions mirrored funeral rituals, but were sufficiently ambiguous 24 that the tent-sitters could claim they were merely asking for help rather than threatening the cadres sent to demobilize them. 25 But the targets of this tactic saw it otherwise. A police officer who took part in the thought work said:
There were two meanings conveyed by their kowtowing. Superficially, they were begging you for assistance and treating you like a Buddha. However, according to Chinese culture, your 'life will be shortened' (zheshou) if older women kneel down and kowtow to you, since we are too young to deserve that.
26
A town cadre who was on the work team also felt threatened. He explained: 'Though they were chanting "we beg you to save us", their real meaning was "we wish you would die". Their kowtowing had malicious intent'.
27
Although the protesters escalated the intensity of their tactics during the first three weeks of the encampment, their actions remained within the bounds of contemporary Chinese protest. As late as early April, while the tug of war between tent-sitters and local authorities was still developing, one official report concluded that 'the protest by the masses is well organized, but their behavior is moderate and not excessive. According to an on-the-spot report filed by a government informant, crowd size surged at noon and then again in the evening after villagers finished their day's work. 'Going to the tent area' (qu dapeng de difang) became a leisure activity that drew hundreds from the surrounding area. 32 When the tent-sitters set off firecrackers or struck a gong, as they did whenever the work team appeared to undertake thought work, 'people came from all directions, as if they were on the way to a theatre performance'. 33 By early April, a small, but effective spectacle had been created and the standoff was the best show for miles around. In the view of the party secretary of Huashui town, the site of the protest had become an entertainment center. From March 30 to April 9, despite the work team's efforts and the detention of several protest leaders, the size of the encampment continued to grow: by April 4 there were fifteen tents; by April 6 there were eighteen. Town and county officials began to fall under great pressure to prevent the appearance of new tents. 35 Owing to concerns that the tent-sitters were 'replacing' (qudai) party leadership in some villages and that the international press might pick up the story, the county party secretary instructed that 'no more tents be built'.
36
Despite this order, the number of tents expanded from eighteen to about two dozen and onlookers continued to stream into the area. County leaders, at this point, decided to turn to a more forceful approach. At about 3am on April 10, they sent in over 1,500 local cadres and public security personnel to put an end to the encampment. During their efforts to clear out the protesters, violence broke out and over 100 officials or police officers and more than 200 villagers were injured; sixty-eight government vehicles were also burned or damaged.
The 'April 10th Incident' was considered excessive by many villagers for three reasons. First, the targets: it was unseemly for representatives of state power to use force on the elderly. 37 Second, word spread that over 3,000 armed police had been sent in, an outsized number to remove a couple dozen tents and suppress a handful of older protesters. Finally, the action was launched under the cover of darkness, like 'Japanese were beaten back by villagers.
38
Seen by many to be overkill and underhanded, the 'April 10th Incident' significantly altered the tone of the protest. Older activists immediately gathered up evidence of the repression and used it to decorate the protest site. They adorned their tents with scraps of police uniforms, batons, helmets, shields, knives, tear gas shells, and red armbands that the police had left behind when they hurried from the scene. These served as both claimed that anyone employed by the polluting factories deserved to be starved.
43
Physical pressure was also employed. On April 25, the owner of one factory was hustled to the encampment and burned with incense. His wife was pushed into a tent and questioned for more than five hours. Her interrogators required that she write a 'selfcriticism' (ziwo jiantao) and admit that their factory produced toxic waste. She was also forced to promise to compensate villagers. Some older protesters pasted slips of white paper on factory gates, once again evoking funeral rituals. More than 2,000 onlookers watched the drama unfold that day. earning money from the factories by removing toxic waste went to the encampment and quarreled with several tent-sitters. This enraged the protesters and others present. As a result, hundreds of people set out on a 'search and confiscation' (chaojia) mission to find evidence that the men had benefited from their contracts with the factories. 46 The raid soon spiraled out of control, and searching turned into ransacking. At the homes of both men, furniture, appliances, and windows were broken or damaged.
47
The evidence of repression and increasingly dramatic performances drew tens of thousands to the encampment. 48 Beyond local people, spectators poured in from nearby counties, especially from April 10 to April 15, when burned-out vehicles and other signs of police action remained on the scene. 49 Huashui became a popular site for tourism and pilgrimages. 50 One taxi driver told a Guardian (UK) reporter who was on his way to cover the story: 'Aren't these villagers brave? They're so tough. It's unbelievable. Everybody wants to come and see this place. We really admire them'. 51 Another person the journalist spoke with, a fashionable young woman from Yiwu County, said excitedly:
'We came to take a look because many people have heard of the riot. This is really big news'. 52 So many onlookers flocked to Huashui that it became difficult to find a spot to park a car. Traffic at times came to a standstill, but visitors were so eager to see the encampment and the residue of the repression that some walked the entire 18 km from Dongyang city to the chemical park.
53

The Power of Spectacle
Vigil tents, dramatic performances, and evidence of suppression gave rise to a fullfledged protest spectacle in Huashui. The power of the display was partly a product of effective, increasingly radical tactics that drew more and more people to the site. But equally important, this long-running show was fueled by a blunder made by the county government. As the party secretary of Huashui town explained: 'Our key problem was that many cars had been destroyed, which attracted too many people to visit. The incident was originally nothing, but it got 'stir-fried' (chaozuo). . . . If they had taken my advice to clean up all the vehicles damaged on the night of April 10, no trace would have been left'.
54
Repression and the tactical escalation that followed brought newcomers to the encampment and empowered the tent-sitters in a number of ways. First, the spectacle helped people in the surrounding area learn about a protest that the state-run media was ignoring. 55 Prior to the police action of April 10, there were no reports in the official press, even though more than one hundred work team members had descended on the encampment and the number of tents had grown from one to two dozen. Even with the news blackout, word that something was happening started to get around; villagers from neighboring communities heard about the protest, passersby saw the tent-sitters blocking the park's entrance, and shoppers wandered through on market days. That the April 10 repression occurred on a market day and an annual fair took place from April 11-13 only heightened the number of onlookers on hand to watch the intensifying spectacle and become part of it. The scheduling of the police action was a serious miscalculation that boosted the audience, as a number of food sellers and early shoppers witnessed the repression and many other non-locals observed its immediate aftermath.
The growing spectacle also conveyed information about the protest from the tentsitters' perspective and offered a counter-narrative to the official one. villagers solve their problems, sarcastically said: 'Seeing this, I guess everyone here understands how our government helps ordinary people: they came in the thousands, drove up in 60 to 70 vehicles, and carried knives, truncheons, and tear gas canisters'.
60
The tent-sitters recognized the power of the field of debris and tried their best to prevent The mounting spectacle also led many who flocked to the encampment to offer moral and monetary support. One observer described the scene the second day after the repression as follows: 'Onlookers were shocked by the trophies that villagers had seized. They were taking pictures, reading every slogan, and going into tents to talk with older protesters. No one wanted to leave'. 62 Spectators provided more than sympathy and praise. An elderly female protester recalled: 'One night when I kept vigil, a stranger came to our tent with candies, biscuits and money. He said to us: "You are suffering bitterness. Here is some food for you, in case you are hungry at night"'. 63 Visitors also made significant financial contributions to keep the protest going. Several donation boxes were set up in the encampment, with lit candles placed in front of them, to suggest the worthiness of making an offering. By the time the protest concluded, over 100,000 yuan (about US$16,000) had been contributed. 64 Finally, the crowd that the residue of repression attracted protected the tent-sitters and increased the likelihood that concessions would be made. Right after the 'April 10th
Incident', the protesters and villagers who supported them were worried because they had time, 'the whole town was trembling' 66 and many expected more repression soon. 67 However, after they saw a flood of supporters arriving, their anxiety declined and they started to experience the joy of success. A victory celebration went on for nearly a week and the encampment and its environs took on the atmosphere of a festival. One commentator noted: 'People were coming and going, the town was bustling with noise and excitement. . . . The shouts of street vendors were rising here and subsiding there. . . .
Everybody was marveling at the scene'. 68 According to a government report, some villagers even called the national tourism bureau to organize trips for vacationers to spend the Labor Day holiday (May 1-7) in Huashui. 69 As hierarchies began to invert, fear of the police sunk, villagers were emboldened, and the tent-sitters became local heroes. During the 'April 10th Incident', police officers fleeing the area had been forced to strip off their uniforms before they surrendered. 70 After that, police did not dare enter the encampment in uniform and had to wear plain clothes. 71 Previously timid villagers seized microphones out of the hands of officials, denounced the local government, and challenged factory owners directly. When the factory owner who was interrogated by tent-sitters went to the police to complain about her treatment, she was told an investigation was impossible because 'the villagers have great power'. 72 As for the two traitors whose homes were damaged, the deputy party secretary of Dongyang County said in a widely-disseminated speech that although the ransacking was violent and should be treated seriously, there was 'no urgency' (buji) for the police to look into it. 73 The party secretary of Huashui town summed up the shift in power relations that was taking place:
The shibai) 76 and announced that the chemical park would be shut down.
Conclusion
Hard repression often works. It can end an episode of contention and leave protesters feeling beaten and hopeless. But force may also be counterproductive, especially if it is thought to be excessive and information about its use is 'communicated effectively to receptive audiences that are substantial enough that authorities must take their outrage into consideration'. 77 'Repression can sometimes turn the tables on a government, exposing its brutality and undermining its legitimacy while generating public sympathy for protesters'. 78 In Huashui, repression clearly backfired. An ill-considered and poorly-timed police action led to tactical escalation and left protesters with proof that undue force had been used. Burned-out cars, tear gas shells and dramatic performances drew thousands to the scene and generated financial support and acclaim for the tent-sitters. As protesters deployed ever-more radical tactics, officials at higher levels became concerned that social order was breaking down and power hierarchies were being upended. In response to prodding from above, county leaders acted to douse the spectacle. They decided to close the chemical park to quiet the protesters and put an end to the show.
The part that repression plays in tactical radicalization suggests that more research is needed into how tactics change over time. In Huashui, protesters initially limited themselves to restrained acts that are par for the course in contemporary China. The suppression of April 10, however, established a 'norm of violence' 79 and more radical elements of the tactical repertoire were activated. Repression precipitated tactical change, and physical evidence of disproportionate force gave the tent-sitters striking props that made their performances more moving. This is a reminder that a tendency toward tactical escalation in China that has been associated with failure, 80 defending one's honor in the face of non-responsiveness, 81 and acclaim (or pressure) from followers, 82 can also spring from policing mistakes and popular reactions that increase the dramaturgical power of a performance and draw onlookers to a spectacle that the authorities and protesters have jointly created.
Focusing on protest spectacle also tells us something about why some episodes of contention succeed and others do not. In China, it is often said that a 'big disturbance creates a big solution, a small disturbance creates a small solution, and no disturbance creates no solution' (danao da jiejue, xiaonao xiao jiejue, bunao bu jiejue). Several quantitative analyses have confirmed that the number of protesters is strongly associated with concessions. 83 This study reminds us that size and 'disturbance' are not merely a function of how many people take part (the Huashui tent-sitters seldom numbered over a hundred), but also how many people are watching. Spectators are as crucial as participants and dramatic tactics and ham-fisted repression are a reliable way to boost their numbers and extract concessions from leaders who are obsessed with social stability and fear a boisterous crowd viewing a show that the authorities cannot stage-manage.
In Huashui, the size of the spectacle led, in sequence, to repression and giving in.
When tactics were still restrained and the number of onlookers comparatively few, forceful repression seemed a good bet to halt the protest. But when coercion failed to end the action, and then backfired as people came from far and wide to see what had transpired, a large and noisy crowd became a resource rather than a vulnerability for the protesters. A spectacle thus made suppression more likely when it was small, but made concessions more likely when it became large. The growing number of onlookers hamstrung the authorities and left them in a difficult position: use even more coercion to terminate the protest or find a way to pacify the tent-sitters. Even for a muscular authoritarian regime that could have swiftly dismantled the encampment and dispersed the crowd with devastating force, hordes of spectators cheering on the tent-sitters' caused pause. Although pollution is allowed to continue in many locations, in Huashui it was not.
